| INTRODUC TI ON

In regard to sample and data sharing, we recognize the importance of the WHO global influenza surveillance and response system (GISRS) and Pandemic influenza preparedness (PIP) framework, as well as the global initiative on sharing all influenza data (GISAID).
From the Berlin Declaration of the G20 Health
Ministers, May 2017. 1 
| A COMPREHEN S IVE INTEG R ATED G LOBAL SYS TEM
The Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS; formerly known as the Global Influenza Surveillance Network) evolved as an integrated scientific and technical global collaboration to fulfil the objectives and activities of the Global Influenza Programme and 650 000 deaths, 3 and even more so given the constant pandemic threat from recent novel zoonotic influenza infections. While the principal objectives remain little changed, its modus operandi has adapted to the changing intellectual, technical and political environment. 
| UNDER S TANDING INFLUENZ A
Initiated at a time when there was relatively little detailed knowledge about the viruses, their structure and mechanisms of infection, their ecology or the inter-relationships among the influenza viruses infecting humans and animals, research was a high priority, not only of methods for virus detection and analysis of their antigenic properties, but also of the fundamental virological properties of the virus.
Many of the advances in our understanding of influenza were made in close association with the network-the "free" sharing of viruses and information providing a vital resource for the research commu- 10 and the mechanism of virus entry into a cell, and more generally the mechanism of membrane fusion. 11 Other notable spin-offs from research on resistance and immunity to infection were the discovery of interferon 12 and the uncovering of the peptide basis of cell-mediated immunity. 13 It is this scientific excellence within GISRS that has provided the intellectual authority and credibility for confidence, not only in the veracity of the biannual WHO recommendations on vaccine composition, but also in the procedures/methods, guidance and interpretive tools developed to anticipate the risk from seasonal antigenic/ genetic variants and emergent zoonotic infections. Driven by a need to know how best to combat influenza, to improve the efficacy of the vaccines and the effectiveness of vaccination, and the usefulness of antivirals to reduce the disease, GISRS has kept abreast of scientific and technical advances. Developed at the time of the intergovernmental deliberations on sharing H5N1 viruses, extensive discussions involving a broad range of interests, including government and public health officials, scientists and intellectual property experts, as well as GISRS and WHO, on how best to promote timely sharing of genetic sequence data (GSD) pre-publication, resulted in the GISAID data sharing mechanism, the essence of which is the Database Access Agreement (DAA) 35 which governs the sharing of the data in its EpiFlu™ database. The DAA enshrines a code of conduct between providers and users of data which protects the ownership of the data while making it freely available on the proviso that users acknowledge the source of the data and, as appropriate, engage with the originators of the data in the collaborative spirit of GISRS, in a manner consistent with its original intent. 37 Its effectiveness is demonstrated by the prompt release of genetic sequences from the first cases of H7N9 zoonotic infection in China in 2013, which enabled the rapid production by synthetic biology of a candidate vaccine virus within a few weeks, 38 and in ensuring availability of the latest data for the biannual WHO vaccine consultation meetings (VCMs). 39 The close alignment of the principles underlying GISAID's sharing mechanism with the seven key principles for data sharing in a public health emergency enun- 
| VIRUS CHAR AC TERISATI ON AND VACCINE VIRUS S ELEC TI ON
A crucial aspect of GISRS and part of its success is meeting the strict timelines for vaccine virus selection and the manufacture and quality control of vaccine, prior to distribution, a process that takes 6-8 months. 32 Thus, any developments which assist interpretation pathotype. 56 Nevertheless, while such a structured framework upon which to base an assessment of zoonotic viruses is imperfect, it provides a mechanism for prioritising the risks associated with specific viruses, and there can be no doubt that enhancement of collaboration between animal health and human health sectors under the One Health banner should also help to optimise the availability of useful information.
There is a clear lack of fundamental knowledge to predict the likelihood that a particular subtype could cause a pandemic. That it was another different H1N1 virus that caused the latest pandemic, 57 and not a novel subtype different from that already circulating, emphasises the adventitious nature of the emergence of a pandemic virus. That a number of different H1N1 subtype viruses have transferred to pigs points to a predilection of the H1N1 avian viruses for mammalian transmissibility. Moreover, the recent sporadic human infections by swine "variant," H1N1v and H3N2v, viruses, 58 once again begs the question as to the extent to which pandemic viruses recycle. 59 Nevertheless, the persistent circulation of the H3N2 subtype for almost 50 years attests to its resilience and ability to continue to adapt in the human population.
| SCIENTIFI C INNOVATI ON
The pandemic threat also stimulated the WHO GIP to become more The threat of a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus causing zoonotic infections to develop into a pandemic akin to that of 1918-19 caught the imagination and galvanised a global response, one outcome of which was the PIP Framework, instituted to bolster fairness and transparency in the benefit of the "global system." It is important, however, to recognise and be aware of the potential future impact of changes to a network which has been largely autonomous and self-financed by member states for 65 years, to include more formal arrangements for receiving additional financial support from PIP partnership contributions, amounting to half of the estimated running cost of GISRS, and involving WHO, on behalf of member states, directly in formal sharing of IVPP viruses. 21 Given the success of its 70-year-old Global Influenza Programme, the WHO has a crucial responsibility for ensuring that these additional resources are used to the best advantage, in a synergistic manner, to strengthen GISRS, under the umbrella of its GIP, to enable countries to meet their IHR responsibilities and promote benefit sharing initiatives, as well as for ensuring that GISRS' extensive complementary scientific expertise and collaborative ethos remain fully engaged to the benefit of global health security.
While GISRS is at the heart of any response to influenza, im- 
